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Dean Prosser's indignation at the objection that recognizing the inten-
tional infliction of mental distress as a separate tort would create a
"Pandora's box" adequately portrays the opposition the majority of
courts have given to each of the classic policy considerations. Prosser
pointed out that
it is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a 'flood of litigation,' and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice
to deny relief on such grounds.'1
Recognition of the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress
as a separate tort is a great stride in the modern development of the
law. The legal profession has recognized the developments, both in
medical science and the law, and relied thereon in extending the mantle
of protection to an individual's right to enjoy peace of mind without
intentional invasion. Whether this step marks but the midpoint in the
eventual movement to allow recovery for mental distress resulting from
negligent action has yet to be finally resolved.
FRANCIS J. PODVIN
Torts: Trial Court Difficulties in Applying the New Rule of
Fair Mistake to Civil Libel: Defamation, comprising libel and slan-
der, is one of the most complex areas of the law, replete with distinc-
tions and qualifications.' The United States Supreme Court has recently
added to the already existing constitutional restrictions by holding that
the first amendment through the fourteenth "delimits a State's power
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct,"' (emphasis added) unless actual nalice
is shown. Before discussing the significance of this decision, it is neces-
sary to review briefly the traditional law in this area.
Defamation involves the communication to others of matter which
tends to lessen the goodwill, respect, esteem, or confidence in which a
person is held or to encourage derogatory, adverse, or unpleasant feel-
ings or opinions about him.3 Originally, libel was defined as written
defamation. This definition is no longer accurate. Libel, today, consists
in the embodiment of defamation in some seemingly permanent physical
32 PROSSER, op. cit. supra note 13, at 39. See also Kniesin v. Izzo, 22 IIl. 2d 73,
174 N.E. 2d 157 at 165: "Consequently, we must agree with those jurists and
critics who find that the reasons advanced in the cases for denying an action
for the intentional infliction of severe emotional distress have for the most
part been added to support a predetermined conclusion dictated by history
and the fear of extending liability..."
'WINFIELD, TORT 244 (5th ed. 1950) ; PROSSER, TORTS 572 (2d ed. 1955); 1
STREET, FouNDATioNs OF LEGAL LIAILITY 273 (1906).
2New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 84 S. Ct. 710, 727 (1964).
3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 559 (1938).
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form4 (e.g., a motion picture,' statue,6 sign,7 or even trailing plaintiff
in a conspicuous manner8 ).
Once matter is shown to be libelous "per se" (i.e., defamatory on its
face9), it is actionable without proof of damages unless privileged.' 0 One
type of qualified privilege is that which allows publication of matters of
public interest or concern, even though defamatory in nature. This
privilege is limited to matters which are of legitimate concern to the
whole community. It is thought that the social value of such publica-
tion outweighs possible injury to a plaintiff's reputation. The chief
subject of dispute with respect to the privilege of public interest turns
upon misstatements of fact, as distinct from those which express mere
opinion. The majority view is that statements of opinion, although
otherwise libelous, so long as they are fair" and in the public interest
are privileged, but misstatements of fact, even though accidental, are not.
This is the so-called doctrine of fair comment." A minority of courts,
whose number has been increasing in recent years, extend the privilege
not only to statements of opinion, but also to misstatements of fact
otherwise libelous, if made in the public interest and without actual
malice 13
The Supreme Court recently declared in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivani' that the first amendment requires all courts to adopt the
minority position in cases involving criticism of the official conduct of
public officers. Respondent in the Sullivan case was Commissioner of
Public Affairs and Supervisor of the Police Department of Montgomery,
Alabama. Petitioner, the New York Times, ran an advertisement on
4 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 586.
5 Merle v. Sociological Research Film Corp., 166 App. Div. 376, 152 N.Y.S.
829 (1915).
6 Monson v. Tussauds, 1 Q.B. 671 (1894).
7 Tarpley v. Blabey, 2 Bing. N.C. 437 (1936).
8 Schultz v. Frankfort Marine, Acc. & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139
N.W. 386 (1913).
9 Lewis v. Hayes, 177 Cal. 587, 171 Pac. 293 (1918). A given action may
also be libelous "per quod" (i.e., defamatory in the light of surrounding
circumstances). Some courts hold that where libel "per quod" is involved,
special damages must be shown (except in certain instances). Chase v. New
Mexico Publishing Co., 53 N.M. 145, 203 P. 2d 594 (1949).
10 Some courts view the matter differently, holding, in substance, that where
a privilege is applicable, the initial expression is not libelous. In either case,
there is the same result (i.e., no liability). There are two categories of privi-
lege, absolute and qualified. Each category. is broken down into types. Only
that type of qualified privilege pertinent to the subject of this article is dis-
cussed in the text.
"1 "Would any fair man, however prejudiced he might be, or however exag-
gerated or obstinate his views, have written this criticism?" Merivale v.
Carson, 20 Q.B.D. 275, 280 (1887).
'2 It has been adopted in more than three-fourths of the states, including Wis-
consin. See Annot., 110 A.L.R. 412 (1937), supplemented in Annot., 150
A.L.R. 358 (1944).
13 This rule, or a slight variation of it, has been adopted in about one-fourth
of the states. Id., 110 A.L.R. at 435, supplemented in 150 A.L.R. at 362.
14 Note 2 supra.
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behalf of a Negro group seeking donations for the civil rights move-
ment which contained the following statement:
In Montgomery, Alabama after students sang "My Country 'Tis
of Thee" on the State Capitol steps, their leaders were expelled
from school and truckloads of police armed with shotguns and
teargas ringed the Alabama State College Campus. When the
entire student body protested to state authorities by refusing to
re-register, their dining hall was padlocked in an attempt to
starve them into submission .... They have arrested him [Dr.
Martin Luther King] seven times for "speeding," "loitering" and
similar offenses. 15
Respondent claimed that the quoted excerpt was understood as referring
to him, since he was Supervisor of Police (although his name was not
mentioned), and that it diminished his reputation. There were several
factual inaccuracies in the quoted excerpt. The students on the capital
steps sang the national anthem, not "My Country, 'Tis of Thee." The
nine students who were expelled by the Board of Education were
expelled because they sought to integrate a lunch counter, and not be-
cause they led the demonstration on the capital steps. "Not the entire
student body, but most of it, had protested the expulsion, not by refusing
to register, but by boycotting classes on a single day."'16 The campus
dining hall was never padlocked, and although police were deployed
near the campus in large numbers, they did not "ring" the campus on
the occasion in question. Dr. King was arrested four times, instead of
seven as the article stated.' 7
Had the Court chosen to do so, it might have decided the case
against respondent simply on its facts. Respondent, as the Court em-
phatically indicates,"' had failed to prove his case. He did not show that
the advertisement was understood as referring to him. Moreover, even
if it were so understood, he did not show that it tended to diminish
rather than enhance his reputation in the eyes of those who read it.
The Court, however, chose rather to use this appeal as the basis upon
which to enunciate a broad and sweeping constitutional mandate: "[T] he
Constitution delimits a state's power to award damages for libel in
actions brought by public officials against critics of their official con-
duct,"' 9 unless actual malice is shown by the plaintiff. "We must recog-
nize," said Mr. Justice Goldberg in a concurring opinion, "that we are




'is Id. at 730-32.
19 Id. at 727.
20Id. at 736. Justices Goldberg and Black wrote concurring opinions in this
case. They felt that the press should be absolutely privileged when discussing
the official conduct of public officials. In their view, therefore, even if actual
malice could be proved, liability would not attach.
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Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, stated that this coun-
try is committed to a policy of free debate on public issues and that
first amendment guarantees are not conditioned upon factual accuracy.
He admitted that the precise issue involved here was presented to the
Supreme Court in only one previous case and that, in that instance, the
Court was equally divided; therefore, the question was not decided.21
He cited but one federal court case supporting the minority view and
placed heavy reliance upon it 2 2 That case involved an article, pub-
lished in a syndicated column, accusing one Congressman Sweeney of
opposing a certain candidate for a federal judgeship because he was
Jewish. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia dismissed the suit, holding that errors of fact, particularly where
a man's mental processes are involved, are inevitable. As this column
appeared in many different newspapers, Congressman Sweeney also
brought suit for the same libel in various state courts. It is interesting
to note that several state courts following the fair comment rule also
dismissed Sweeney's suit, holding that the column in question con-
stituted no more than fair comment.23
The decision of the Supreme Court, it seems, was governed less by
constitutional precedent than by practical and pragmatic considerations.
Its primary fear was that debate on public issues would be stifled by
"self-censorship" in violation of the first amendment if critics of official
conduct had to guarantee the factual accuracy of their assertions. There
was a difference, in the mind of the Court, betveen what one knows
to be true and what one can prove in court to be true.
Would-be critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing
their criticism, even though it is believed to be true and even
though it is in fact true, because of doubt whether it can be
proved in court or fear of the expense of having to do So.2 4
Another prime consideration in the Court's opinion was "the pro-
tection accorded a public official when he is sued for libel by a private
citizen." 25 Public officials, federal and state, may make any statement
within the outer perimeter of their duties and it is privileged, at least
if it is shown to be without actual malice. The reason behind this privi-
211d. at 720. The case was Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316
U.S. 642 (1942).22 New York Times Co. v Sullivan, supra note 2, at 721. The case was Sweeney
v. Patterson, 128 F. 2d 457 (D.C. Cir. 1942). It should be pointed out that the
court in Sullivan did rely on state court cases advancing the minority "fair
mistake" view. See note 2 supra, at 726 n. 20.23 Sweeney v. Beacon journal Publishing Co., 66 Ohio App. 475, 35 N.E. 2d
471 & 764 (1941); Sweeney v. Newspaper Printing Corp., 177 Tenn. 196,
147 S.W. 2d 406 (1941); Sweeney v. Philadelphia Record Co., 126 F. 2d
53 (3d Cir. 1942). But cf. Sweeney v. Schenectady Union Publishing Co., 122
F. 2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941). This is the case cited in note 21 supra which equally
divided the Supreme Court.24 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 725.
25 Id. at 727.
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lege is that without it, a public official might be less vigorous and effective
in administering the policies of his government.2 6 The Court felt that a
citizen should be accorded the same privilege with respect to public
officials, for "it is as much his duty to criticize as it is the officials' duty
to administer."
27
It is not the purpose of this article to examine this opinion and
analyze the various philosophical positions which underlie the several
opinions of the Justices. What will be attempted is a rather careful
exploration into the practical difficulties a trial lawyer and court might
face in attempting to apply the black-letter rule.
To whom, then, do the benefits of this immunity extend? If limited
to the facts in this case, immunity would extend to large scale news-
papers. The Court, however, does not so limit itself. Perhaps, then,
it extends to everyone within the ambit of the term "freedom of
press." This term is, of course, not limited to newspapers and periodi-
cals, but necessarily embraces pamphlets, leaflets, and every sort of
publication affording a vehicle of information and opinion. 28 Still, the
Court nowhere uses the term "freedom of the press." It does, however,
use the term "libel" in its statement of the rule, and this, it seems, must
be regarded as the limiting factor. Libel does not apply merely to
defamation in the press, but to the embodiment of defamation in any
more or less permanent physical form. It thus appears that immunity
extends to anyone who criticizes official conduct of a public official
and in so doing uses a vehicle which embodies the criticism in some
sort of permaient physical form.29 It is likely, however, that the Court
will soon extend this immunity to one who uses any vehicle of expres-
sion, including speech. The court in Sullivan continually speaks of
"First Amendment freedoms and guarantees," 30 which include, of
course, freedom of speech. More specifically, it speaks of defamation,
which comprises both libel and slander.
The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule
that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct. ... 31
26 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959).
27 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 727. The Court noted
further (at p. 724) that the penalty for criminal libel is often less than the
damages awarded for civil libel (particularly as civil libel is often actionable
without proof of damage). Yet, the defendant in a suit for criminal libel,
unlike a civil libel suit, is accorded the benefits of indictment and proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.2SLovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) ; Cole v. City of Fort Smith,
202 Ark. 614, 151 S.W. 2d 1000 (1941); Knapp v. Post Printing & Publishing
Co., 111 Col. 492, 144 P. 2d 981 (1943).
29 One who, for example, without actual malice makes and displays a statue
of a local politician lifting money from the city treasury would be privileged.
30 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 725 ("First Amendment
Freedoms"), 721 ("First Amendment guarantees"), and 720 ("standards
that satisfy the First Amendment").31 Id. at 726.
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It appears that the scope of this immunity will be broadened to include
speech when an appropriate factual situation arises.
Who, then, may be criticized with unintentional factual error? The
answer, it appears, is a public official. But who is a public official? Is
the local dogcatcher a public official? The Court gives no answer to
this, except to state in a footnote that it has "no occasion.., to specify
categories of persons who would or would not be included." 32 This
wording at least implies that there is some limitation other than the
broad grouping, "public official." Such a construction would appear
wise, for among the more minor officials, at least, private life looms
larger than public. The result is that a factually erroneous statement
would do more injury to such a man's private life than to his public
life. It is not clear whether to be a public official one must actually hold
an office. In the first presidential race between Governor Stevenson and
General Eisenhower, could one misstate facts in criticizing Stevenson
who was then Governor of Illinois, but not Eisenhower who held no
public office? The Court gives no direct answer, except to cite several
cases in a footnote which apply the same rule to candidates for public
office.33 It is suggested that the term public figure is more in accord
with the Court's intent than "public official." Must this public figure
be a person somehow connected with political or governmental activi-
ties? This does not seem to be the case. The broader privilege of com-
ment on matters of public interest, 34 of which this privilege as to public
figures is but an offshoot, applies to any matter of concern to the whole
community. Thus, it appears, a religious leader might be as much a
public figure as a political leader.
What, then, may be criticized? The answer, it appears, is the official
conduct of a public figure. But what is official conduct in a given case?
The answer to this question would seem to be of critical importance to
a trial lawyer faced with a client seeking to know if he has a cause
of action, or to a trial court faced with a case of this sort. Still, the
Court expressly refuses to define this term in any way. 35 In Bar v.
Matteo,36 the Court held that the comments of a federal official are abso-
lutely privileged if made "within the outer perimeter"37 of his duties.
Correlating the two cases, it is suggested that the trial court is to de-
cide from the facts of a given case whether the activity commented upon
32 Id. at 727 n. 23.
3 Id. at 726 n. 20. Cases cited are: Phoenix Newspapers v. Choiser, 82 Ariz.
271, 276-77, 312 P. 2d 150 (1957) ; Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn.
226, 230, 203 N.W. 974 (1925); Chagnon v. Union Leader Corp., 103 N.H.
426, 438, 174 A. 2d 825 (1961).
3 See p. 129 supra as to the privilege of comment on matters of public interest.
It is universally agreed that the rule of fair comment applies to public figures,
not simply political figures.
35 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 727 n. 23.




is within the outer perimeter of the public figure's duties. This, if cor-
rect, is a most vague standard.
Are there any limits to this privilege? The only limit is that the
factually erroneous criticism may not be made with actual malice. Tra-
ditionally, when a document has been found both libelous and unprivi-
leged, malice has been implied. Actual or express malice, however, may
not be implied from the document itself or even from suspicious ex-
trinsic circumstances.
38
Within libel and slander law "Actual Malice" frequently called
"express malice" or malice in fact means personal spite, hatred
or ill will and is not merely malice in law, that is, the inten-
tional doing of a wrongful act without just cause or excuse.39
The Court itself asserts that to find actual malice, the statement must be
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."
40
As a practical matter, actual malice is difficult to prove in a court-
room. Mr. Justice Black, in a concurring opinion, quite aptly comments:
"'Malice,' even as defined by the court, is an elusive, abstract concept
hard to prove and hard to disprove." 4' Editorial comment in some news-
papers indicates a belief that they have now been given a free rein. The
import of this decision, in their opinion, is that a newspaper printing
factual matter on the official conduct of public figures need do little
checking as to the accuracy of its assertions.42 Yet courts have ex-
pressed willingness to find actual malice if the defendant did not have
reasonable grounds or probable cause to believe in the truth of his
charges,43 or if he did not make such investigation as to the truth of
the charge as the nature of the charge and all surrounding circumstances
demanded.4 4 Certainly, the facts in Sullivan indicate that the Times had
reasonable cause to believe in the truth of its advertisement, and that
it did not print it with "reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not." Thus, while this rule protects inadvertent factual error,4 5 it may
well require such investigation into the truth of reported facts on the
part of a newspaper as is consistent with the term "responsible journal-
38 Phoenix Newspapers v. Choisser, 82 Ariz. 271, 312 P. 2d 150 (1957) ; Pulver-
mann v. A. S. Abell Co., 131 F. Supp. 617 (1955).
39 Robinson v. Home Fire Marine Ins. Co., 244 Iowa 1084, 59 N.W. 2d 776
(1953).
40 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 726.
41 Id. at 733.
42 See, e.g., Milwaukee Journal, Mar. 13, 1964, pt. 1, p. 18, col. 1.
43 Williams v. Standard Examiner Publishing Co. 83 Utah, 31, 27 P. 2d 1 (1933);
Good v. Higgins, 99 Kan. 315, 161 Pac. 673 (1916); Coleman v. MacLennan,
78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 (1908); Mulderig v. Wilkes-Barre Times, 215 Pa.
470, 64 At. 636 (1906).
44 Egan v. Dotson, 36 S.D. 459, 155 N.W. 783 (1915).
45Many writers have urged some extension of immunity to protect against in-
advertent factual error. PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 603; Note, 25
MINN. L. REv. 495 (1941); Note, 38 HARV. L. REV. 1100 (1925).
[Vol. 48
RECENT DECISIONS
ism," as determined by general practice among newspapers and periodi-
cals of average caliber.46 The rule of fair comment with respect to the
official conduct of a public official has been replaced (in the author's
view) by a rule of fair mistake .4 7 This implies that while the require-
ment that the assertion be "comment" has been abrogated, the require-
ment that it be fair is still very much existent.
The burden of proof as to the matter of malice in fact is expressly
placed upon the plaintiff.48 The problem thus arises as to the nature and
quantity of proof a plaintiff must produce before a defendant must
come forward with rebuttal evidence and show proper and responsible
journalistic techniques, when such defendant has pleaded "fair mis-
take." The Court did not deal with this evidentiary question. If, on the
one hand, this means that the plaintiff (to reach the jury) must show
that internal newspaper procedure (reporting, data checking, etc.)
was not what it should have been, his burden may be difficult, practically,
to sustain. If, on the other hand, it simply means that he must show
that the true facts were readily available or that a simple check would
have shown the error, the requirement would not appear too stringent.
This latter alternative, it seems, would make the rule practically work-
able.
From the point of view of the trial court and the trial lawyer, there-
fore, what at first appears to be a clearly defined black letter rule leaves
many questions unanswered. Whether this rule will be interpreted lib-
erally, as has been suggested, or narrowly is a matter for future con-
struction. It appears, nevertheless, that this test, like the Roth49 test
for obscenity, will involve judicial (trial and appellate) examination
of individual cases on their facts rather than legal rules or syllogisms.
ROBERT A. MELIN
Federal Jurisdiction: The Abstention Doctrine-Two recent de-
cisions illustrate the problems created in applying the abstention doc-
trine, which arose as a result of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.' The doctrine
is a self-limitation upon the jurisdiction of federal courts when they
are presented with suits which deal with questions of unclear or un-
decided state law. In these cases, the federal courts, acting in matters
46The same sort of standard would apply, of course, to individuals and organ-
izations other than newspapers seeking to invoke the privilege (i.e., probable
cause to believe in the truth of the charges and/or such investigation into
their accuracy as all the circumstances indicate is necessary). It should be
noted, however, that more than mere negligence or lack of reasonable care
is required to hold a statement, otherwise meeting the requirements, to be
unprivileged.
47 The term "fair mistake" has been coined by the author in the belief that it
succintly expresses the new rule, as the term "fair comment" did the old
rule.
48 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra note 2, at 726.
4 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
' 304 U.S. 64 (1937).
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